Multipolar Security Forum in Moscow: the majority world facing a changing global agenda

Putin's message: interdependent security and global cooperation

Vladimir Putin addressed the participants of the International Security Forum on May 28, 2026. The gesture served a political function: to place the forum within a broader agenda of international cooperation, regional stability, and global security.

The central idea of the message is that security can no longer be understood in isolation. A regional crisis, a terrorist threat, a technological escalation, a rupture in supply chains, or a food crisis can affect the entire international system. Contemporary security is interdependent.

That framing allows Russia to shift the conversation. The international discussion on security is no longer reduced to Ukraine, sanctions, or confrontation with the West; it broadens toward transnational threats: terrorism, extremism, organized crime, drug trafficking, nuclear proliferation, cybercrime, information security, media manipulation, and the vulnerability of critical infrastructure.

Security, in this reading, is not only military. It is also technological, informational, biological, food-related, water-related, cultural, energy-related, and civilizational.

From technical meeting to strategic platform

The International Security Forum was designed as a broad platform. The 14th meeting of high representatives was not an isolated event, but part of a larger framework that combined official meetings, political debates, thematic conferences, and discussions on new threats.

That difference matters. A technical meeting exchanges diagnoses. An international forum seeks to build language, networks, agenda, and legitimacy.

This space functions as a platform where non-Western actors can debate security issues without necessarily going through institutions dominated by the United States or Europe. This does not mean that Russia is creating a complete alternative to the UN, the OSCE, or the Euro-Atlantic architecture. But it does consolidate parallel spaces of strategic conversation.

International security is no longer discussed only in Western forums. Moscow acts as host, moderator, and central actor of an alternative conversation.

The Russian narrative: security versus hegemony

The Russian narrative on international security is organized around one central opposition: hegemony versus multipolarity.

From Moscow's reading, the order led by the West is based on the expansion of military alliances, sanctions, political pressure, information control, selective intervention, and the instrumental use of international norms. Against that, Russia seeks to present an alternative vision based on sovereignty, non-interference, balance of power, indivisible security, and respect for diverse civilizational models.

This narrative is not primarily aimed at convincing Washington or Brussels. It is aimed at countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America that have historical experiences of colonialism, dependency, financial pressure, or external intervention.

Russian language seeks to connect contemporary security with broader problems: neocolonialism, cultural sovereignty, information control, defense of traditional values, manipulation of narratives, and historical memory.

Security, in this reading, is not only a problem of weapons. It is a dispute over the very meaning of international order.

The majority world and collective responsibility for security

One of the forum's most important concepts was the idea of collective responsibility for world security. The meeting was presented as a space where the countries of the majority world recognized the inevitability of changes in international relations and expressed a willingness to participate in shaping that new environment on equal terms.

This idea is central to understanding Russian strategy. Multipolar security appears here as a shared demand from emerging countries claiming greater participation in global governance, not only as a specifically Russian national agenda.

The presence of representatives from Russia, China, India, South Africa, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, and other actors made it possible to project a broader narrative: the international system can no longer be managed by a small group of Western powers. Economic, demographic, technological, and political power is shifting, and that change should also be reflected in the rules of security.

This point allows the forum to be read as something more than a security meeting. It is a proposal for order: collective security, not security at the expense of others; multipolarity, not unipolar hierarchy; cooperation between platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, not exclusive dependence on Western institutions.

BRICS, the majority world, and multipolar security

The forum showed that the discussion on multipolar security is not limited to Russia. The 14th international meeting of high representatives responsible for security affairs brought together representatives from Russia, China, India, South Africa, Brazil, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, who discussed the formation of a multipolar world, the strengthening of trust among states, and the elaboration of common rules for new technologies.

This allows the forum to be read as a platform of the so-called majority world. It was not merely a Russian critique of the Western order, but a space where different actors presented their own priorities on sovereignty, security, technology, development, and reform of international governance.

Russia presented an agenda of coordination among the countries of the Global South and the East. Sergei Shoigu proposed strengthening the UN's central role, supporting the group of friends in defense of the UN Charter, avoiding the provocation of contradictions among the countries of the Global South and the East, advancing the Greater Eurasian Partnership, building a collective security architecture in Eurasia, and working on resource reserves, including agricultural products, fertilizers, and hydrocarbons. He also called for not strengthening one's own security at the expense of the security of other states, and for deepening coordination in BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other majority-world formats.

China, through Chen Wenqing, linked the forum to Xi Jinping's global initiatives on development, security, civilization, and governance. The Chinese position defended multilateralism, respect for international law, the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and the idea of a shared future for humanity. In that framework, Beijing seeks to present security as a process of adaptation to an international architecture in transformation, where traditional and non-traditional threats must be confronted through cooperation rather than closed blocs.

India, represented by Ajit Doval, placed the emphasis on UN reform, the fight against terrorism, and the need to recognize the new weight of emerging economies. Its message was that power is no longer concentrated in a small group of countries and that the Global South demands equal participation in the management of world affairs. This position is relevant because India does not want a unipolar order, but neither does it want a multipolarity dominated by a single alternative center. Its bet is on a more representative architecture in which emerging powers have a real voice.

South Africa linked security to sovereignty, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, energy, and African integration. Khumbudzo Ntshavheni argued that the formation of a multipolar world opens new opportunities for Global South countries, but that those opportunities must be translated into concrete capabilities: modernization of security, development of artificial intelligence, strengthening of cybersecurity, energy security, and expansion of economic ties through the African Continental Free Trade Area. This reading connects security with development, infrastructure, and African regional capacity.

The importance of the African component is that these concerns appeared with an unusual centrality in forums dominated by Western agendas. In this space, African countries could present their own concerns about energy security, connectivity, cybersecurity, industrialization, regional integration, food, and infrastructure not as secondary themes, but as part of the global architecture of stability. That difference matters: in many traditional forums, Africa is usually treated as an object of assistance or a scene of crisis; here it appears as an actor that defines priorities and claims its own capacities.

Brazil, through Celso Amorim, introduced a key idea: multipolarity must not become a simple division of the world into spheres of influence. His approach points to a multipolarity based on the right of sovereign states to diversify their alliances, defend their national interests, and participate in processes of sustainable development. This position is especially important for Latin America because it avoids presenting multipolarity as automatic alignment with one bloc against another.

Kazakhstan presented a modern security agenda that combines interstate relations, the economy, the natural environment, and the digital environment. Its proposal to create an international water security organization under UN auspices shows that fresh water is entering the center of strategic security. It also defended universal norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace and warned that artificial intelligence is moving from being an auxiliary tool to becoming an active subject within contemporary systems of decision and security.

Malaysia added a technological dimension to the debate by warning that the world appears to be moving toward a division of high technologies, especially in artificial intelligence. Its proposal for a common platform among BRICS countries to facilitate cooperation in AI connects directly with the discussion on technological sovereignty, digital fragmentation, and closed technological systems. In this approach, security no longer depends only on defense or diplomacy, but on the ability to cooperate in critical technologies before the world becomes divided into incompatible ecosystems.

This diversity of positions shows that the forum was not only a Russian platform of denunciation against the West. It was also a space where the countries of the majority world tried to place their own priorities: UN reform, collective security, AI, cybersecurity, water, energy, regional integration, technological cooperation, and multipolarity without rigid spheres of influence.

The potential exists, but it will depend on the ability to turn declarations into projects, institutions, norms, and practical cooperation.

Artificial intelligence and security: the new field of vulnerability

One of the most important axes of contemporary security is artificial intelligence. AI is no longer only an economic or technological tool. It is an infrastructure of power.

AI can strengthen defense, border surveillance, threat detection, data analysis, cybersecurity, and crisis management. But it can also amplify risks: information manipulation, automation of cyberattacks, mass facial recognition, predictive surveillance, automated disinformation, falsification of images and videos, and the creation of artificial narratives at scale.

Kazakhstan's warning about AI as an active subject reflects an important conceptual shift: artificial intelligence is no longer understood only as auxiliary software, but as a factor capable of influencing decisions, critical systems, cybersecurity, defense, the economy, and governance.

For Russia, China, the United States, Europe, and the Global South, AI is already part of the national security architecture. Whoever controls data, models, computing centers, the cloud, and analytical systems will have an advantage not only in economic terms, but also in military and informational terms.

Twenty-first-century security will depend as much on missiles and armies as on algorithms, satellites, data, and digital platforms.

Fake news, manipulation, and cognitive warfare

The discussion on information security is central in the Russian narrative. Moscow considers that contemporary wars are not fought only on the military field, but also in the minds of societies.

Fake news, deepfakes, coordinated social media campaigns, emotional manipulation, the use of algorithms to amplify narratives, and media interference form part of what can be described as cognitive warfare.

From this perspective, national security includes the capacity to protect the population against psychological operations, social destabilization, electoral manipulation, induced polarization, and the loss of trust in institutions.

This approach is not exclusive to Russia. The United States, the European Union, China, and other actors are also developing policies to confront disinformation, digital manipulation, and the risks of generative AI.

The problem is that the struggle against disinformation can become a dilemma: to protect the information space without falling into censorship, excessive control, or the criminalization of public debate.

Starlink, OneWeb, and the dispute over satellite systems

The forum also makes it possible to observe a key issue: the security of satellite systems.

In recent years, platforms such as Starlink and OneWeb have shown that low-Earth-orbit satellite constellations can be decisive in communications, warfare, intelligence, civil connectivity, and emergency operations. But they also pose risks for states.

Satellite connectivity is no longer only civil infrastructure. It is a strategic tool. It can maintain communications during conflicts, support military operations, transmit information, connect isolated territories, and at the same time challenge the ability of states to control their information space.

The dispute over satellite connectivity will be one of the most important frontiers of global security.

Europe: militarization, migration, and crisis of legitimacy

From the Russian narrative, Europe is going through a strategic transformation. The militarization of the continent, the increase in defense spending, the expansion of NATO, migratory pressure, and the crisis of social cohesion are presented as signs of a model under tension.

Moscow interprets European militarization as strategic subordination to the United States and as part of an architecture of confrontation with Russia. At the same time, it tends to present European migration policy as an internal contradiction: Europe promotes universal values, but faces difficulties integrating migrants, controlling borders, and sustaining social consensus.

This approach can be debatable from the West, but it has analytical value because it shows how Russia is trying to dispute the narrative about Europe. For Moscow, the European problem is not only military. It is civilizational, demographic, social, and identitarian.

European security, in this framework, is not measured only by tanks, missiles, or military budgets. It is also measured by internal cohesion, political legitimacy, migration management, cultural identity, and strategic autonomy.

Propaganda, traditional values, and spiritual dispute

The Russian security agenda includes a cultural dimension. Moscow insists that the security of states also depends on the protection of traditional values, historical memory, national identity, and cultural sovereignty.

This language is part of a broader dispute. Russia presents the West as a promoter of cultural models that it considers alien, individualistic, or uprooted, while trying to position itself as a defender of traditional values, family, religion, historical continuity, and civilizational plurality.

This point must be understood as a battle for legitimacy. Russia is not only discussing military power. It is discussing who defines what is correct, modern, acceptable, and universal.

For some countries of the Global South, the discourse on traditional values may resonate as a defense against Western cultural homogenization. For others, it may be seen as a political tool to justify internal control.

Fresh water, food, and biotechnology: the material security of the twenty-first century

International security is also changing because material threats are multiplying.

Access to sources of fresh water, food, fertilizers, seeds, biotechnology, food supplements, agricultural chains, and public health will become increasingly important. Climate crises, population growth, wars, sanctions, trade restrictions, and health risks can turn these sectors into fields of strategic dispute.

Kazakhstan's proposal to create an international water security organization under the auspices of the UN confirms that fresh water is ceasing to be a secondary environmental issue and is becoming a matter of strategic security. Its approach includes monitoring transboundary basins, water-saving technologies, and the peaceful resolution of water disputes.

Biotechnology, in particular, has a dual dimension. It can improve health, food production, vaccines, agriculture, epidemiological prevention, and climate adaptation. But it also poses risks: genetic manipulation, misuse of pathogens, dependence on external biological inputs, and vulnerabilities in health chains.

Drones add another layer of complexity. They can be used for agricultural monitoring, disaster response, health surveillance, or the delivery of supplies. But they can also become vectors of risk if they are used to transport dangerous substances, contaminate infrastructure, or generate social panic. This risk must be addressed through biosafety, regulation, and prevention.

Food, water, and biological security are no longer a secondary agenda. They are part of the core of national security.

The Global South as the main audience

The forum is not designed primarily for the West. It is designed for the rest of the world.

The forum speaks to actors who do not want to be trapped between rigid blocs, who want to diversify relations, or who distrust an international order defined exclusively by Western powers.

Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America are key audiences. For those spaces, Russia seeks to project three messages.

First, that it remains a relevant power.

Second, that it can offer cooperation in security, defense, intelligence, energy, food security, cybersecurity, and the fight against transnational threats.

Third, that multipolarity can open room for maneuver in the face of structures dominated by the West.

The challenge is that many Global South countries do not want to replace one dependency with another. They do not necessarily seek to align with Moscow. They seek options.

Implications for Latin America

Latin America must observe this kind of forum with pragmatism.

The region does not need to adopt the Russian narrative or align automatically with Moscow. But neither can it ignore that global security is becoming more plural. The United States, China, Russia, Europe, and regional actors compete to define which threats matter and which responses are legitimate.

For Latin America, this has concrete implications: cybersecurity, transnational crime, drug trafficking, artificial intelligence, critical infrastructure, energy, defense, sanctions, information, media, migration, water, food, and military cooperation.

If the region does not define its own priorities, other actors will define them for it.

The strategic question is whether Latin America can build an autonomous security policy capable of engaging with different centers of power without becoming subordinated to their agendas.

Possible scenarios

Conclusion

The International Security Forum in Moscow was more than a meeting of experts or officials. It was the consolidation of Russia as an organizing actor in the global debate on security.

Putin's message, the agenda of the Russian Security Council, and the 14th meeting of high representatives show a clear strategy: Russia has installed a multipolar security agenda that disputes the very definition of international security.

For Russia, security can no longer be defined solely by the West. It must include sovereignty, non-interference, regional stability, information security, protection against manipulation, traditional values, the struggle against neocolonialism, cooperation against transnational threats, and control over critical infrastructure.

But the forum also showed something broader: multipolar security is not an exclusively Russian agenda. China, India, South Africa, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and other actors of the majority world placed on the table their own priorities: UN reform, multilateralism, counterterrorism, AI, cybersecurity, water, energy, regional integration, new technologies, and multipolarity without rigid spheres of influence.

The question is not whether Moscow can replace the Western security architecture. It cannot do so alone. The issue is that Russia has already installed a dynamic of alternative dialogue and, if it maintains institutional continuity, participation by the majority world, and links to concrete issues such as AI, water, food, energy, and cybersecurity, it has the conditions to sustain it over time as a platform of negotiation, diversification, and autonomy for the Global South.

Open questions

• Is Russia building an alternative security architecture or a platform of resistance against the West?
• Can the Global South benefit from these forums without becoming trapped in great-power rivalries?
• Will multipolar security increase the autonomy of emerging countries or multiply the pressures on them?
• Can Latin America define its own strategic threats without importing external agendas?
• Will twenty-first-century security be decided more on the military field or through control of information, data, biotechnology, and critical infrastructure?